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ARE CAPITAL DEFENSE LAWYERS EDUCABLE? A MODERATELY
HOPEFUL REPORT FROM THE TRENCHES
David L. Szlanfucht*
I. INTRODUCTION
The most common claim asserted by death row inmates is ineffective assis-
tance of trial counsel.' However, as this Article will demonstrate, courts rarely
find ineffective assistance of counsel and, consequently, they uphold death sen-
tences in capital cases. The purpose of this Article is to investigate whether, as
Supreme Court capital punishment law has become more familiar and under-
stood, capital lawyers have made fewer egregious mistakes during their represen-
tation of capital defendants.
Research for this Article centered on the State of Georgia because that state
has a moderately-sized volume of death penalty cases, which enabled a detailed
analysis of each capital defendant's ineffectiveness argument. Some Georgia
capital defendants' claims, however, could not be analyzed because they did not
assert an ineffectiveness claim. 2
To test this Article's thesis-that capital lawyers have, over the course of twen-
ty-five years, made fewer egregious mistakes during their representation of capi-
tal defendants-three separate periods of time will be examined in order to
assess whether attorneys are making the same mistakes during representation of
a capital defendant, and whether those mistakes are egregious, or are mere tech-
nicalities. The time periods include 1973 through 1983, 1985 through 1990, and
1992 through 1998. This Article uses 1973 as the beginning point from which to
evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims because this date marks the
beginning of modem death penalty law. The primary reason for choosing 1985
through 1990 was to take into account the effect that the 1984 promulgation of
* The author is an associate with Heyl, Royster, Voelker and Allen in Peoria, Illinois. J.D., Drake University
Law School, 1999; B.A., Bradley University, 1996. The author wishes to thank Professor David McCord-
Richard M. and Anita Calkins Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa-for his
expertise in death penalty law and his guidance in writing this Article.
1. See Brad Snyder, Note, Disparate Impact on Death Row: M.L.B. and the Indigents Right to Counsel at
Capital State Postcomiction Proceedings, 107 YALE L.J. 2211, 2247 n.202 (1998).
2. To see the complete list of defendants sentenced to death in Georgia, see Tonya D. McClary, NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Director of Research Criminal Justice Project, (on file with author).
The author took each name on this list and conducted a WestLaw search as follows: "ti(defendant's full name)
& effective ineffective /s assistance /s counsel & death /s convict! sentenced."
3. In 1972, the Court in Furman v. Georgia held that the imposition of the death penalty under the Georgia
and Texas death penalty statutes constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). Furman invalidated many
states' death penalty statutes; following Furman, 34 states, including Georgia, adopted revised statutes that pro-
vided guidelines for the sentencing authority. See Marion T. Pope, Jr., A Study of the Unified Appeal Procedure
in Georgia 23 GA. L. REV. 185, 218 (1988).
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Strickland v. Washington4 may have had on capital lawyering. Additionally, it
was necessary to analyze ineffective assistance claims between 1992 and 1998 so
as to provide a more accurate and thorough understanding of the true trend and
current state of capital lawyering.
The issue thus becomes: What are egregious mistakes? Although it is difficult
to distinguish between egregious and merely technical errors, one commentator,
Professor William Geimer, has proposed a checklist of minimum standards by
which courts should address ineffective assistance of counsel claims more effec-
tively than the method imposed by Strickland.' Professor Geimer offered the fol-
lowing checklist of minimal duties of capital defense counsel:
(1) To read and become familiar with every capital opinion by the Supreme
Court, the appropriate federal circuit court, and appropriate state courts since
1972.
(2) To collect every document relevant to the life of the client, and to the
offense with which he is charged. For example: medical records, school
records, social service reports, military records, prison records.
(3) To ensure that the following persons are interviewed:
a. The client.
b. All members of the client's family, employers, teachers, friends, and all
private or government personnel who have or at one time had a legally recog-
nized obligation to the client. For example: doctors, social workers, public
assistance officials, jail personnel.
c. All law enforcement officers involved in the case.
d. If they consent, all prospective prosecution witnesses, including family
members of the victim.
e. All prospective defense witnesses identified by client and by investigative
steps outlined in this checklist.
(4) To secure every resource to which the client is entitled, without reciprocal
obligation, by rule, statute, or constitution.
(5) To secure all information regarding the prosecution's case and all exculpato-
ry evidence to which the client is entitled, without reciprocal obligation, by rule,
statute, or constitution.
(6) In every case that an investigation leads counsel to conclude that the prose-
cution can prove some criminal offense, to seek to negotiate a non-capital dispo-
sition of the case.
(7) To refrain from entering on client's behalf a plea of guilty to an offense for
which death is a possible penalty without formal or strong informal prior assur-
ances that death will not be the sentence.
4. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Prior to Strickland, lower courts had no guidance as to
the appropriate test for ineffectiveness claims. In 1984, however, the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland provided that guidance. Strickland changed the way by which courts began to approach ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. Thus, it was imperative that the author take a sampling of capital defendants both
prior to and immediately after this landmark decision was handed down.
5. See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the
Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 91 (1995).
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(8) To examine every prospective juror regarding attitude toward imposition of
the death penalty and, where applicable, exposure to pre-trial publicity; there-
after, to challenge for cause or peremptorily every prospective juror whose
responses indicate to counsel that the prospective juror would be substantially
impaired in considering the particular evidence to be offered in mitigation on
behalf of the client, or whose responses disclose a bias toward imposition of the
death penalty. To direct further questions to all jurors who express reservations
about imposition of the death penalty, with a view toward ensuring that no such
jurors are excused for cause unless, under existing law, they are truly unquali-
fied to sit.
(9) To refrain at all times from distancing himself from the client in the pres-
ence of others, or communicating in any manner to the judge or the jurors any-
thing less than complete commitment to the client's cause.
(10) At the guilt or innocence phase of trial, to advance by affirmative evidence,
cross-examination, or other challenge to the prosecution's evidence, some theo-
ry of defense suggesting that the client is not guilty or is guilty of a non-capital
offense or offenses.
(11) Where the client is convicted of an offense punishable by death, to put on
evidence and argument, not solely argument, in support of an articulable theory
of mitigation developed from prior investigation.6
This checklist is not exclusive because it does not address pre-trial motions prac-
tice or timely objections and motions during trial that may be necessary to pre-
serve the rights of the client on appeal. Professor Geimer's guidelines provide
minimum duties or responsibilities that should be imposed on capital counsel.
Thus, the checklist will function as the basis on which this Article will distinguish
between egregious mistakes of counsel and those that are mere technicalities.
There is also a significant question about how to judge whether ineffective
assistance of counsel claims of defendants on appeal are arguably meritorious-
thus reflecting possible trial attorney ineffectiveness--or whether they are frivo-
lous, in which case they should count for nothing in the analysis because a frivo-
lous claim of egregious ineffectiveness constitutes no evidence of ineffective per-
formance. Because trial court records are inaccessible, this Article relies on
appellate opinions, which are often skimpy on details of the claims. In light of
this difficulty, this Article will proceed on the assumption that the appellate
defense lawyers were acting in good faith; i.e., that there is a plausible (although
rarely persuasive to the Georgia Supreme Court) basis for each allegation of inef-
fective assistance of counsel.
It is significant to note that this Article's analysis is not rendered meaningless
by virtue of the fact that the Georgia Supreme Court rejected virtually all of the
ineffectiveness claims. It is still possible to draw conclusions about whether
Georgia capital defense lawyers have "smartened up" over time by examining the
claims of ineffective assistance, whether those claims ultimately succeeded or
6. See id. at 168-71.
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not. If it appears the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which zealous
appellate lawyers have regarded as plausible to raise, have become fewer and/or
of a more marginal nature over time, this is an indication that capital defense trial
lawyering has, in general, improved in Georgia over the time periods examined.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS: 1973 THROUGH 19831
A. Summary of Cases
1. Terry Lee Goodwin8 (8/27/75):
Goodwin was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He then appealed
the denial of his habeas petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
Specifically, he argued that his former counsel failed to: (1) challenge the arrays
of the grand and petit juries; (2) challenge the defendant's illegal arrest; (3) per-
fect proper Witherspoon9 objections; (4) object to the failure of the court to
charge mitigation and to request such a charge; (5) object to the defendant's prior
convictions being admitted; (6) object to the victim's family being seated inside
the bar; (7) interview some prosecution witnesses; (8) object to leading ques-
tions; and (9) impeach certain prosecution witnesses.
The court held that Goodwin's former counsel rendered effective assistance of
counsel. Specifically, the court held the failure to challenge the arrays of grand
and traverse juries was not, in itself, ground for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, failing to make Witherspoon objections was moot because the rele-
vant prospective jurors were dismissed. Finally, the court held the attorneys did
not need to interview all of the state's witnesses because they had the state's files
involving the case.
2. Jerome Bowden" (12/9/76):
Bowden, an indigent, was sentenced to death for murder. He alleged ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claiming that his attorney: (1) should have paid out of
his own pocket for expert psychiatric witnesses; (2) should have spent about four
hours investigating for each prospective juror, in preparation for voir dire; and
(3) failed to push more aggressively on the issue of possible mental defect or
insanity.
The court found no evidence of ineffectiveness, stating that the leading defense
attorney, Mr. Oates, was assisted by two other attorneys-Mr. Cain, who visited
the defendant before trial and helped in the conduct of the defense at trial, and
Mr. Collins, who specialized in criminal law and assisted in most aspects of the
7. According to records provided by the NAACP, 168 defendants were sentenced to death between 1973
and 1983. Of these defendants, 43 were re-sentenced to death during this period of time. As one would natu-
rally expect, nearly all 168 defendants appealed their death sentence.
8. Goodwin v. Hopper, 253 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1979).
9. In Witherspoon, the United States Supreme Court held that a juror may be excused for cause where he
makes it clear that he would automatically vote against a sentence of death without regard to any evidence that
might be developed at the trial of the case before him. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514 (1968).
10. Bowden v. Zant, 260 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. 1979).
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pre-trial, trial, and post-trial phases. The court held that the law did not require
defense counsel to pay out of his own pocket for expert witnesses for an indigent
defendant, nor did it require counsel to spend three or four hours of investigation
for each prospective juror, in preparation for voir dire. Finally, the court ruled
there existed no evidence of incapacity which defense counsel failed to uncover.
3. John Young11 (1/9/76):
Young was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to death. On
appeal, he alleged he was denied a fair trial due to the ineffective assistance of
counsel during trial.
The court explained that the right to effective assistance of counsel does not
mean errorless counsel or counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel
reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.
Consequently, the court held that defendant's allegation of ineffective assistance
of counsel was without merit in that defendant's trial counsel filed several
motions and special pleas before trial and ably supported them with argument.
Furthermore, defense counsel made additional motions during trial, interposed
objections, and conducted thorough cross-examinations of the state's witnesses.
Defendant's death sentence was thus affirmed.
4. Jack Alderman" (6/15/75):
Alderman was convicted for murder by a jury and sentenced to death. On
appeal, the defendant alleged he was denied effective assistance of counsel for
the following three reasons: (1) counsel's motion for continuance was denied on
grounds of absence of a witness who was subpoenaed but not served; (2) coun-
sel's failure to object at trial to the state's revealing to the jury that, during an
interview with a Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) agent, the defendant
exercised his right to an attorney and remained silent; and (3) counsel's allowing
the state, through the testimony of a GBI agent, to fortify the testimony of a key
witness by reference to the propounded use of a polygraph test.
The defendant's trial counsel failed to set out the eight statutory requirements
that should have been shown for the granting of a continuance during pre-trial,
and said motion was thus denied. Because defendant's trial counsel did not
object at trial to the GBI's testimony, this failure to object to the admission of the
complained-of testimony constituted a waiver. Finally, the court noted that the
GBI agent's reference to a polygraph examination had no probative value and did
not bolster the witness's credibility.
The court held, without much comment and based upon the standard set forth
in Pitts v. Glass,3 that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel.
11. Young v. State, 236 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1977).
12. Alderman v. State, 246 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. 1978).
13. Pitts v. Glass, 203 S.E.2d 515, 516-17 (Ga. 1974) (stating the standard of effective counsel as not error-
less counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel "reasonably likely to render and ren-
dering reasonably effective assistance").
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5. Charlie Young" (2/19/76):
Young was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, he argued
ineffective assistance of counsel, in that his counsel: (1) failed to investigate the
case properly and prepare for trial; (2) deprived him of a fair trial by deliberately
waiving his right to an independent Jackson-Denno hearing;"5 (3) refused to
allow the defendant to take the stand to testify in his own defense, particularly
during the sentencing phase; and (4) failed to request a charge by the court dur-
ing the sentencing phase that as a mitigating circumstance Young had no previous
criminal record.
The court did not find any evidence supporting Young's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. First, the court found that the defendant did not set forth evi-
dence that the investigations by his attorney were inadequate to determine legal
defenses available or to prepare for trial. Second, the defendant failed to show
prejudice or cause for relief resulting from counsel's waiver. Third, trial counsel
discussed the implications of the defendant's taking the stand and the defendant's
voluntary relinquishment of that right. However, the court did note that in some
circumstances, where counsel refused to put the defendant on the stand, such
action would require a finding of ineffectiveness of counsel. Finally, the defen-
dant's retained attorney repeatedly solicited testimony from state witnesses that
Young had no prior criminal record, had good character before the crime, and
that Sheriff Wyatt had personally written a recommendation for the defendant
previously. As a result, the court concluded that the habeas court was correct in
holding that defense counsel provided reasonably effective assistance of counsel.
6. Charles Corn 6 (2/26/76) and (5/29/76):
Corn was convicted of robbery and murder and sentenced to death for each
offense. On appeal, the defendant argued ineffective assistance of counsel claim-
ing that his counsel did not spend enough time on his case.
Corn filed his motion for continuance on May 24, 1976, the day of trial. There
was some indication that he had been represented by the same two attorneys
since August 21, 1975, and the record was clear that they had represented him
since his arraignment on October 28, 1975. The defendant's attorneys had been
furnished copies of psychiatric evaluations conducted by the state and had two
state-paid private psychiatric evaluations. Counsel was informed of the list of
the state's witnesses on October 29, 1975. On November 13, 1975, the state
served defense counsel with a complete list of names and addresses of witnesses
to be used in the sentencing phase of Corn's trial. A continuance was granted on
Corn's motion for further psychiatric evaluation. A hearing on his special plea of
insanity was held and evidence was produced by each party. Both attorneys for
14. Young v. Ricketts, 250 S.E.2d 404 (Ga. 1978).
15. A Jackson-Denno hearing is a pre-trial hearing at which a judge determines the constitutionality of
seized evidence or received confessions. The Supreme Court articulated the rule establishing these hearings as
the constitutional norm in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
16. Corn v. State, 240 S.E.2d 694 (Ga. 1977).
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Corn were present at the sentencing trial following an earlier plea to the charges
in this case. Thirteen state's witnesses appeared and defense counsel had the
opportunity to make a thorough and sifting examination of each. Consequently,
the court denied the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and
upheld defendant's death sentence, explaining that defense counsel had ample
time to prepare for trial.
7. Gary Lee Hawes" (12/9/76):
Hawes was convicted of murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and pos-
session of a firearm during commission of a felony. As a result of the murder
conviction, Hawes received the death sentence. On appeal, the defendant alleged
the convictions and death sentence should be vacated because he was given inad-
equate representation by court-appointed counsel. Specifically, Hawes argued
that his former counsel failed: (1) to file a motion to suppress evidence; (2) to
cross-examine the state's key witnesses as to their credibility and reliability; (3)
to request a charge on circumstantial evidence; (4) to give an adequate closing
argument; (5) to interview witnesses testifying on behalf of a motion for change
of venue; and (6) to raise the issue of the composition of the grand and traverse
juries.
The court explained that defense counsel had about five years of legal experi-
ence, had two, more experienced attorneys assisting him, demanded a copy of an
indictment and list of witnesses, asserted several well-argued motions, and inter-
jected numerous objections to the introduction of evidence and testimony of wit-
nesses at trial. As a result, the court stated "'the decisions on which witnesses to
call, whether and how to conduct cross-examinations, what jurors to accept or
strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategies and tactical
decisions [were] the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his
client."' 18 Thus, because trial counsel's conduct was considered tactical in nature,
the court held that the defendant was not denied his constitutional right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel.
8. Ivon Ray Stanley 9 (1/15/77):
Stanley was convicted and sentenced to death on charges of felony-murder,
armed robbery, and kidnapping with bodily injury. The defendant contended that
he was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel should have been
appointed upon his arrest, since his indigency was apparent and he was available
for interrogation while in jail.
However, the court explained that all of the evidence indicated Stanley never
requested appointment of counsel and that he declined offers of assistance of
counsel. In fact, the court went on to state that the defendant waived acceptance
of counsel at his arrest. Thus, the court held that the delay in appointing counsel
17. Hawes v. State, 240 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. 1977).
18. Id. at 836 (quoting Reid v. State, 219 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. 1975)).
19. Stanley v. State, 241 S.E.2d 173 (Ga. 1977).
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did not deprive Stanley of the effective assistance of counsel and his death sen-
tence was consequently affirmed.
9. Robert Franklin Godfrey" (3/13/78) and (11/20/80):
Godfrey was convicted of murder and aggravated assault and received two sen-
tences of death. He argued ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, saying
that his counsel: (1) did not file a challenge to the traverse jury pool, and (2) did
not timely file a challenge to the composition of the grand jury.
Prior to the defendant's first trial, trial counsel filed several motions, including
a challenge to the composition of the grand jury. However, the habeas court dis-
missed this motion as untimely because Godfrey had already been indicted.
First, the Georgia Supreme Court held that where no cause was shown, mere
allegation that a jury challenge was untimely filed will not support a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, Godfrey's counsel testified that he had
considered a challenge to the traverse jury but believed it would be dismissed
and thus, unsuccessful. The court held that counsel's failure to file a challenge to
the traverse jury was a tactical decision and thus, not ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. Therefore, the court concluded that "neither defense counsel's fail-
ure to timely challenge the composition of the grand jury nor his tactical decision
not to challenge the traverse jury array resulted in denial of [defendant's] Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel."21 Godfrey's
death sentence was thus affirmed.
10. Roland Paul Hamilton22 (8/1/78) and (9/8/80):
Hamilton was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The habeas court
set aside the defendant's murder conviction and death sentence on the grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the supe-
rior court's conclusion that counsel was ineffective at both the guilt-innocence
and sentencing stages of his trial for the following reasons: (1) although counsel
knew four or five members of the traverse jury panel, he questioned only three
jurors on voir dire, and only as to a matter unrelated to capital punishment; (2)
counsel made no application for investigative funds and conducted no indepen-
dent investigation; (3) counsel failed to personally interview any witnesses prior
to their testimony; (4) counsel failed to cross-examine the defendant's girlfriend
about the autopsy report and other expert medical evidence that revealed two
types of wounds inflicted upon the deceased, supporting the defendant's state-
ment that his girlfriend hit the victim on the head with a bottle; (5) counsel did
not investigate the deceased's known propensity for violence; (6) counsel failed
to investigate the grounds of the girlfriend's testimony and to question her credi-
bility; (7) counsel failed to investigate a prior criminal conviction entered against
20. Godfrey v. Francis, 308 S.E.2d 806 (Ga. 1983).
21. Id. at 810.
22. Zant v. Hamilton, 307 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. 1983).
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the defendant when he was eighteen years old, even though defense counsel
knew that this would be offered against the defendant if he were convicted; (8)
counsel never contacted any member of the defendant's family before trial, even
though family members could have given evidence of mitigation; and (9) counsel
did not require the state to disclose its agreement not to prosecute defendant's
girlfriend.
The court thus concluded that evidence supported holding that the defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty stage of his trial, but did
not support the conclusion that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at
the guilt-innocence stage. Therefore, the court affirmed the setting aside of the
defendant's death sentence, but reversed the setting aside of the murder convic-
tion.
11. William Spicer Lewis23 (7/19/79):
Lewis was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and motor vehicle theft and
was sentenced to death for murder. On appeal, the defendant argued ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The court, finding no evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, explained
that defense counsel was familiar with the facts, filed several pre-trial motions
and argued those motions vigorously, conducted an extensive voir dire examina-
tion, objected and moved to excuse certain prospective jurors, objected during
trial, and presented evidence in mitigation during the sentencing phase.
Moreover, the defendant previously tried to plead in return for a recommendation
of a life sentence. Furthermore, the court noted that evidence of guilt was over-
whelming and defense counsel cross-examined witnesses when the opportunity
arose and when he could elicit favorable responses.
Lewis was indicted for malice murder, but the jury was not instructed that if it
found felony murder it could not also convict on the underlying felony, which
was a lesser included offense of felony murder. Therefore, despite not finding
ineffectiveness of trial counsel, the court vacated his death penalty due to
improper jury instructions.
12. Van Roosevelt Solomon24 (9/27/79):
Solomon was convicted for the murder of a manager of a gasoline station and
was sentenced to death. On appeal, the defendant contended that his retained
trial counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance during trial.
Solomon argued that his trial counsel should have objected to the introduction of
prior convictions during the pre-sentencing hearing because one of his convic-
tions was rendered when he was fifteen years old. He also argued that trial coun-
sel should have questioned prospective jurors about racial prejudice during voir
23. Lewis v. State, 268 S.E.2d 915 (Ga. 1980).
24. Solomon v. State, 277 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1980).
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dire, and should have stricken a juror who said during voir dire that he had heard
privileged information about the case, but could not remember it.
The court noted that defense counsel was familiar with the facts of the defen-
dant's case, filed and vigorously argued several pre-trial motions, conducted an
extensive voir dire examination, cross-examined witnesses, argued in defense of
his client, objected during trial, and presented evidence in mitigation during sen-
tencing. Moreover, the court noted that trial counsel vigorously represented his
client and sought in every manner to avoid the death penalty. The court also
found that counsel was faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt. As noted in
Pitts v. Glass,2" effective counsel does not mean "errorless counsel and not coun-
sel judged ineffective by hindsight but counsel reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance."2 As a result, the court held that coun-
sel did not render ineffective assistance, primarily because trial counsel made
many difficult decisions, all of which were tactical and thus not subject to inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims.
13. Larry Romine27 (4/3/82) and (8/29/85):
Romine was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of his parents
and the armed robbery of his mother. On appeal, the defendant contended the
fast pace of the trial denied him effective assistance of counsel.
The defendant's trial began with voir dire on Monday morning and ended on
Saturday evening. Court was allegedly in session until 8:30 p.m. Monday, 9:00
p.m. Tuesday, 6:30 p.m. Wednesday, 7:00 p.m. Thursday, 10:00 p.m. Friday, and
5:00 p.m. Saturday. Counsel was appointed almost one year prior to trial.
Counsel's investigation was assisted by a private investigator retained with funds
furnished by the trial court. Counsel was also assisted by his associate through-
out trial.
The court held that Romine's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was with-
out merit because he "ha[d] not shown in what way his attorney would have been
more effective had the case been tried at a slower pace."28 The court, however,
did set aside the defendant's death sentences on different grounds.29
14. William Alvin Smith" (9/15/81):
Smith was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At trial, the defendant
elected to plead not-guilty to the murder and armed robbery charges, and it was
25. Pitts v. Glass, 203 S.E.2d 515 (Ga. 1974).
26. Id. at 516-17.
27. Romine v. State, 305 S.E.2d 93 (Ga. 1983).
28. Id. at 98.
29. The court reversed the defendant's death sentences due to the trial court's denial of his motion for con-
tinuance. The largest factor in the court's denial of continuance was its belief that the defendant's father's testi-
mony would have been inadmissible in mitigation. However, Georgia courts have "consistently refused to place
unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered in mitigation at the sentencing phase of a death
penalty case." Id. at 101. The Georgia Supreme Court found this denial by the trial court clearly erroneous and
required reversal of defendant's death sentences.
30. Smith v. Francis, 325 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. 1985).
[VOL. 19:305
ARE CAPITAL DEFENSE LAWYERS EDUCABLE?
counsel's duty to provide assistance to him in the guilt-innocence and sentencing
phases of the trial. On appeal, defendant complained of ineffective assistance of
counsel, claiming his trial counsel asserted an unfounded defense of insanity.
However, the court held that counsel's actions were reasonable under the circum-
stances due to a not-guilty plea, a confession, and a witness who arrived during
the commission of the crimes and could positively identify the defendant.
15. Norman Darnell Baxter"1 (9/30/83):
Baxter was convicted of murder and sentenced to. death. He then argued inef-
fective assistance of counsel for his counsels' failure to investigate, discover, and
present evidence of his allegedly impaired mental condition. The court disagreed
with the defendant's argument, explaining that his counsel testified that while the
defendant was uncooperative on a few occasions, they had no difficulty commu-
nicating with the defendant, that the defendant understood the nature and objec-
tive of proceedings against him, and that the defendant was capable of assisting
them in the preparation of his defense.
B. Conclusions
Of the 168 defendants sentenced to death in Georgia between 1973 and 1983,
only fifteen death row inmates argued ineffective assistance of counsel.32 As a
result, only 11.2% of capital defendants sentenced between 1973 and 1983
asserted the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Georgia death row inmates
asserted a wide range of ineffective assistance of counsel arguments between
1973 and 1983. Based on the foregoing, trial counsel appear to have made
repeated egregious blunders during this time period.
In only one instance prior to the promulgation of Strickland did a death row
inmate successfully assert the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, thereby
having his death sentence set aside.' The Hamilton court based its holding on
counsel's extreme lack of investigation and preparation. 34 The court explained
the following egregious errors were committed by trial counsel: failure to inves-
tigate the deceased's known propensity for violence and Hamilton's prior crimi-
nal conviction, failure to interview a single witness or any member of Hamilton's
family, only questioning three jurors during voir dire (and only on matters unre-
lated to capital punishment), and making no request to the court for funds.35
Even though all other ineffective assistance of counsel claims made by capital
defendants between 1973 and 1983 failed, there were several claims of ineffec-
tiveness premised on egregious lapses. One such egregiousness claim included
capital defendants who asserted a failure to examine every prospective juror
regarding their attitudes on the death penalty during voir dire. Goodwin asserted
31. Baxter v. Kemp, 391 S.E.2d 754 (Ga. 1990).
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. Zant v. Hamilton, 307 S.E.2d 667 (Ga. 1983).
34. Id. at 669.
35. Id. at 668.
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ineffective assistance of counsel based upon counsel's failure to make
Witherspoon objections, in that counsel should have objected to two prospective
jurors who revealed an inclination to vote for the death sentence regardless of the
evidence presented. In addition, Solomon argued ineffectiveness of counsel
because counsel did not question prospective jurors about racial prejudice during
voir dire. Similarly, Solomon asserted ineffectiveness premised on an egregious-
ness claim due to counsel's failure to strike a prospective juror who stated that he
had heard, but could not remember, privileged information regarding the case.
Another egregiousness claim included counsel's failure to interview appropri-
ate witnesses. Goodwin argued ineffective assistance of counsel premised,
among other allegations, upon counsel's failure to interview prosecution witness-
es. Similar to failing to interview key witnesses, a fourth egregiousness claim of
ineffectiveness made prior to Strickland was counsel's failure to conduct an ade-
quate investigation. Charlie Young made such a claim when he argued that coun-
sel failed to thoroughly investigate his case and prepare for trial. In addition,
Hawes asserted that counsel did not interview witnesses who testified during a
motion for change of venue.
The most repeated claim of ineffectiveness premised on an egregious lapse by
counsel was, by far, counsel's failure to thoroughly investigate each prospective
juror and to object to certain prospective jurors. Bowden asserted such a claim,
specifically arguing that his counsel should have spent three or four hours inves-
tigating each prospective juror. However, the court noted that counsel had no
duty to spend three or four hours of investigation for each prospective juror.
Goodwin, Hawes, Godfrey, and Hamilton all asserted similar claims.
III. SUPREME CouRT RuLING IN Strickland v. Washington
Prior to the landmark decision in Strickland v. Washington,3" promulgated by
the United States Supreme Court in 1984, lower courts fought over the standards
for defining ineffective assistance of counsel.37 Courts employed a variety of
stringent tests to determine whether counsel was ineffective: a "mockery of jus-
tice" test, a "sham" test, an "absence of judicial character" test, a "farce" test,
and a "travesty of justice" test. 8 These tests provided little, if any, guidance to
capital counsel in understanding the standard of effectiveness by which they
would be judged.
Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, every
criminal defendant possesses the right to "Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."39 However, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that
36. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
37. See Ivan K. Fong, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461, 467
(1987).
38. See Derrick Augustus Carter, A Restatement of Exceptions to the Preservation of Error Requirement in
Criminal Cases, 46 U. KAN. L. Rav. 947, 961 (1998) (citations omitted).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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this constitutional mandate includes that capital counsel must be effective."' In
Strickland, the Supreme Court tried to define the type of attorney behavior that
would violate the Sixth Amendment by establishing a two-prong test to evaluate
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. To obtain reversal of a conviction, the
defendant must prove: (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness; and (2) that counsel's deficient performance preju-
diced the defendant, resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome
of the proceeding."' A defendant's failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland
test negates a court's need to consider the other. 2 Moreover, courts presume
effectiveness and avoid speculation through the application of hindsight. 3
Nevertheless, the defendant must point to actual ineffectiveness, either through
specific errors or omissions of counsel, and may not rely solely on the surround-
ing circumstances in order to prove ineffective assistance.4
There are several reasons courts are reluctant to reverse a capital defendant's
conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel:
(1) the state is not responsible for and hence not able to prevent attorney errors,
(2) it would force the trial judge to intervene in the defendant's case and under-
mine defense counsel's strategy, (3) attorney errors occur in a variety of ways,
but are basically harmless, (4) legal representation is an art, and an act or omis-
sion that is considered unprofessional in one context may be 'sound or even
brilliant' strategy in another, and (5) it would discourage trial lawyers from
accepting court assignments.4"
"[D]espite the adoption of standards that suggest a greater receptiveness to
claims of ineffective assistance, reversal of a conviction or sentence on grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel remains uncommon."" Courts often decline
to scrutinize trial counsel's actions and omissions because they could be consid-
ered "tactical" or "strategic" decisions, and thus are nearly immune to reversal."7
Other courts deny relief, sometimes without even reaching the issue of effective-
ness, on the ground that the capital defendant did not establish that "actual preju-
dice" resulted from the challenged acts or omissions." The Strickland test has
been criticized as a "paper tiger": The courts' reluctance to engage in Monday-
morning quarterbacking explains why many apparent lawyering errors are held
to be within the range of competent conduct or are dismissed as harmless. 9
40. See Richard P. Rhodes, Jr., Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the Capital Defendant's Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 121 (1992). The Supreme Court first recognized
the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) and
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
41. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 689-90.
44. See id. (emphasis added).
45. Carter, supra note 38, at 961-62.
46. See Helen Gredd, Washington v. Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital
Sentencing, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1544, 1552 (1983).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See James P. Fleissner, Criminal Law and Procedure: A Two-Year Survey, 48 MERCER L. REV. 219, 291
(1996).
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IV INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS: 1985 THROUGH 199050
A. Summary of Cases
1. Johnny B. Johnson"1 (7/17/85):
Johnson was convicted for murdering a police officer and sentenced to death.
In his appeal from the denial of habeas corpus relief, the defendant contended
that he was deprived effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the defendant
argued that his court-appointed counsel: (1) failed to interview key witnesses to
ascertain the essential facts of the homicide; (2) did not devote sufficient time
conferring with him before trial; (3) neglected to discuss with him possible
defenses; (4) did not sit with the defendant during trial; (5) failed to introduce
evidence as to lack of criminal intent; (6) failed to advise him about making his
unsworn statement to the jury; (7) should not have waived a commitment hear-
ing; and (8) was disloyal to him. In response, the defendant's trial counsel
denied the defendant's claims and testified that he had provided the best repre-
sentation possible under the adverse circumstances which then existed, and that
he knew the essential facts and sought to use them to Johnson's best advantage
under rules of law.
The court affirmed the habeas court, which held the defendant had failed to
carry the burden in connection with his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
and that the claim was without merit. The court explained that the defendant's
claims did not approach the criterion of whether the representation amounted to a
sham or mockery of justice. "At most, the evidence shows that the claim here is
mere hindsight.
5 2
2. Robert Leonard Black 3 (5/10/88):
Black was convicted of murder and several other offenses and sentenced to
death. On appeal, the court reversed his death sentence because the jury verdict
failed to include an essential element, but the court remanded the issue of inef-
fective assistance of counsel. On remand, the court found that Black did not
waive his right to assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel and an evidentiary
hearing was held. The defendant then appealed the denial of his motions for a
new trial and to quash the indictment. The defendant sought a new trial based
upon his complaints of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Black asserted twenty-five allegations of ineffectiveness of trial counsel during
the pre-trial, competency, guilt-innocence, sentencing, and post-conviction phas-
es of his case. Black argued that his "trial counsel failed to develop the insanity
defense relied on at trial, refused to present any self-defense claim, neglected to
50. Sixty-five defendants were sentenced or re-sentenced to death between 1985 and 1990. As one would
naturally expect, all defendants during this time period appealed their death sentence.
51. Johnson v. Caldwell, 187 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 1972).
52. Id. at 847.
53. Black v. State, 448 S.E.2d 357 (Ga. 1994).
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make proper requests for charge and reserve objections, and failed to present any
defense in the sentencing phase."54
The court ruled that the performance of Black's attorney at the pre-trial, com-
petency, and guilt-innocence phases was "not so defective as to render the trial
unfair.""5 First, the court explained that trial counsel was an experienced criminal
defense attorney who conferred frequently with Black about his defense,
employed two investigators, and filed several motions. Furthermore, the court
explained that Black had failed to fully cooperate with his trial counsel by not
submitting to an independent psychiatric examination. Moreover, counsel's deci-
sion to pursue an insanity defense as opposed to self-defense was a legitimate
trial strategy within the range of reasonable professional assistance. In addition,
the court noted that Black failed to show the necessary prejudice from his attor-
ney's failure to present evidence of mitigating factors during the sentencing
phase and failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's
errors, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt regarding his guilt.5 "
Therefore, the court held that Black was not entitled to a new guilt-innocence
trial based on the ineffective assistance of counsel.
3. Exzavious Lee Gibson 7 (6/14/90):
Gibson was convicted of murder and armed robbery and was sentenced to
death. On appeal, the defendant complained that the attorney general moved to
quash subpoenas, to assess costs, and to find the defendant's attorney in contempt
of court for filing the subpoenas. In response, defense counsel, stating he did not
want to suffer the court's contempt and had no funds to pay the costs, withdrew
the subpoenas. Gibson argued "that the state's 'bullyboy' tactics 'compelled' his
withdrawal of the subpoenas and denied him effective assistance of counsel." 8
The court stated that the threats in the motion to quash the subpoenas were dis-
tasteful, but held that the defendant was not compelled to withdraw his subpoe-
nas, and that the state did not impair the defense attorney's representation of the
defendant.
4. Eric Lynn Ferrell" (9/17/88):
Ferrell was convicted of murder in the death of his grandmother and cousin,
armed robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon-he was sen-
tenced to death. On appeal, Ferrell attacked nearly every decision made by trial
counsel: (1) counsel was not sufficiently prepared for his Jackson-Denno testi-
mony; (2) counsel did not consult the defendant about the genuineness of
54. Id. at 358.
55. Id.
56. The court explained that eyewitness testimony to the shooting and beating of the victim, and evidence
that Black shot police officers who came to investigate, both support this conclusion.
57. Gibson v. State, 404 S.E.2d 781 (Ga. 1991).
58. Id. at 785.
59. Ferrell v. State, 401 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. 1991).
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Ferrell's signature on his written statements; (3) the search warrant was not chal-
lenged even though the application was based on hearsay; (4) some of the state's
witnesses were not interviewed; (5) cross-examination of several of the state's
witnesses was cursory; and (6) expert witnesses were not objected to.
The court noted that trial counsel thoroughly investigated the case and pre-
pared for trial. The defendant simply did not set forth any evidence that would
demonstrate that his trial counsel failed to exercise reasonable, professional judg-
ment in the handling of his case. At the sentencing phase of trial, trial counsel
interviewed several potential witnesses in mitigation, many of whose names had
been furnished by the defendant. Moreover, few people could testify favorably
on behalf of the defendant and, those who could, did testify at trial.
Consequently, the court held that the defendant did not show he was denied
effective assistance of counsel.
5. Emmanuel Hammond0 (3/8/90):
Hammond was convicted of malice murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery,
and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court remanded the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. On remand, the superior court found
that counsel was not ineffective.
Hammond's arguments for ineffective assistance included: (1) his trial counsel
should have moved for a mistrial after the prosecutor argued to the jury that he
should not be given a life sentence because "[t]here is no life without parole in
Georgia. So one day he will be a free man;"" (2) counsel had an actual conflict
of interest created by the "media rights" contract Hammond allegedly entered
into with counsel; 2 (3) counsel was ineffective in eliciting "bad act" and "bad
character" testimony about Hammond from various witnesses at trial;63 (4) coun-
sel failed to object to the admission of Hammond's juvenile court record; (5)
counsel failed to adequately investigate and present evidence at both phases of
trial on the issue of Hammond's mental health; (6) counsel failed to consult men-
tal health experts regarding Hammond's ability to understand the nature of his
plea offer; (7) counsel failed to move for a change of venue to another county
where potential jurors would not have been exposed to extensive pre-trial publici-
ty; (8) counsel failed to object to the district attorney's question to prospective
jurors during voir dire regarding potential racial bias, because Hammond was
black and the victim was white; (9) counsel should not have called unprepared
defense witnesses, "who added nothing positive to the defense; '64 and (10) coun-
sel failed to present sufficient mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of
trial.
On return of the case, the Georgia Supreme Court first held that counsel's fail-
ure to move for mistrial in response to the prosecutor's argument was not ineffec-
60. Hammond v. State, 452 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. 1995).
61. Id. at 748.
62. Id. at 750.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 753.
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tive assistance of counsel. Counsel's failure to move for mistrial did not under-
mine the reliability of the result of the sentencing trial because counsel objected
to the prosecutor's improper argument. In addition, the evidence against
Hammond was overwhelming and Hammond failed to satisfy his burden of
showing that, had a motion for mistrial been made, "the decision reached would
reasonably likely have been different.""5 Second, Hammond failed to show the
existence of an actual conflict of interest or that such a conflict adversely affect-
ed trial counsel's performance. Third, any bad-character evidence elicited by
counsel was a defense tactic which did not amount to the denial of effective
assistance of counsel. Fourth, evidence of Hammond's juvenile court record was
admissible and, thus, counsel's failure to object could not be considered defi-
cient. Fifth, trial counsel was not ineffective merely because he initially request-
ed a mental health examination by a state doctor, and Hammond did not suffi-
ciently show prejudice by counsel's failure to secure a mental evaluation before
the trial date. Sixth, Hammond's allegation that counsel's failure to consult men-
tal health experts was without merit in that it was based entirely on conjecture.
Seventh, counsel's decision not to move for change of venue was based on trial
strategy. Additionally, Hammond set forth no evidence to support his assertion
that a change of venue would have been more advantageous to his defense.
Eighth, Hammond failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that counsel's
actions and inactions during voir dire "fell outside the 'wide range of reasonable
professional assistance."'6 Ninth, Hammond failed to show that his last allega-
tion of ineffectiveness so undermined the adversarial process that he was
deprived of a fair trial. Finally, Hammond did not suggest any additional miti-
gating evidence that could have and should have been presented so as to prove
ineffectiveness. Consequently, the court concluded that trial counsel did not ren-
der ineffective assistance in the direct appeal of Hammond's case.
6. Carlton Gary67 (8/27/86):
Gary was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to death. On
appeal, the defendant argued ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel rep-
resented the defendant pro bono. He first secured the dismissal of the defen-
dant's court-appointed counsel. The defendant was represented by two additional
attorneys, acting pro bono, during much of the pre-trial proceedings. Gary
requested funds for forensic and investigative assistance, but was denied.
However, trial counsel stated during pre-trial proceedings that because of the
lack of funds and time, he was unprepared to try the case. The case proceeded to
trial despite counsel's objection. The court then exercised its discretion to
remand the case for a hearing to determine whether, for any reason, including
lack of funds, the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.
65. Id. at 750.
66. Id. at 752 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
67. Gary v. State, 389 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 1990).
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The trial court explained that the defendant, through a hearing before the court
with counsel of his own choosing, had the opportunity to argue any and all possi-
ble errors affecting the trial or prejudicing the defendant. The defendant refused
to accept the opportunities provided to him. Moreover, the defendant asserted
his privilege not to have his counsel testify. This was true even though the defen-
dant was made aware by the court that this hearing was his opportunity to have
the ineffective assistance of counsel issues litigated. Thus, the trial court held,
and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, that the defendant knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily waived his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
7. David Brantley' (2/17/89):
Brantley was convicted of two counts of murder for which a death sentence
was imposed. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, but
reversed the death sentence imposed on one count of murder and remanded for
resentencing. On remand and with the state's consent, Brantley elected to be
sentenced to life without parole. Brantley then appealed the denial of his chal-
lenges to his resentence. Brantley argued that his sentence of life without parole
should have been set aside by the trial court because ineffective assistance of
counsel "rendered his acceptance of the sentencing agreement involuntary as a
matter of law."'69 He further argued ineffective assistance because he was not
given the opportunity to review and rebut victim impact statements pursuant to
the Georgia Code.70
The Georgia Supreme Court held that Brantley was not denied effective assis-
tance of counsel. First, the court explained that Brantley's two attorneys' com-
ments in correspondence regarding the life-without-parole statute71 and defen-
dant's slim possibility of parole did not constitute ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. Moreover, Brantley's attorney testified that he spoke with Brantley on sever-
al occasions about electing life without parole; that, after speaking with citizens
of the county in which he was convicted, the attorney believed Brantley would
again be sentenced to death if he did not so elect; that no promises or threats
were made to Brantley or his attorney; and that counsel was confident that
Brantley understood the implications of the sentence and elected it knowingly
and voluntarily. In fact, the court emphasized:
Prior to sentencing, Brantley executed an 'Election of Defendant to be
Sentenced to Life Without Parole' in which he affirmed that he understood the
status of his case on remand, that the State had previously indicated its intention
to seek the death penalty, and that, with the State's consent, he was electing
imprisonment for life without parole. Brantley also executed a written
'Acknowledgment of Defendant' in which he admitted, inter alia, that he com-
68. Brantley v. State, 486 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. 1997), cert. denied, Brantley v. Georgia, 118 S. Ct. 449 (1997).
69. Id. at 170.
70. GA. CODEANN. § 17-10-1.2 (1997).
71. The court stated that "[tihe letters did not make any promises or guarantees of parole, and the evidence
plainly shows that Brantley's decision did not turn on the attorneys' conjecture, rather Brantley knowingly opted
for life in prison without the possibility of parole in order to spare himself." Brantley, 486 S.E.2d at 171-72.
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mitted the murder of his former sister-in-law while he was engaged in the mur-
der of his ex-wife; that he understood that the State had indicated its intention to
again seek the death penalty; that he understood that if he was sentenced to life
without parole he would serve the remainder of his natural life in prison without
the possibility of parole; that he was not under the influence of any drug, medi-
cine, or alcohol; that he understood he had the right to trial by a jury but waived
that right as to all issues; that he had the rights to have favorable witnesses tes-
tify and to question and cross-examine prosecution witnesses but waived such
rights; that he understood had he elected to go to trial, he could have been sen-
tenced to death or to life in prison with the possibility of parole; that no one had
made him any promise or threat to cause his election; and that he was satisfied
with his provided attorneys and had been informed of all of his rights and
options.72
As a result, the court concluded that Brantley's plea was voluntarily entered.
Second, the court noted that counsel's failure to comply with the Georgia Code73
did not provide a basis for invalidating his sentence and that Brantley failed to
show detriment caused by the admission of victim impact statements without the
opportunity to rebut or review them.
8. Jimmy Fletcher Meders74 (4/7/89):
Meders was convicted of malice murder and armed robbery and was sentenced
to death. On remand, the trial court concluded that the defendant had not been
denied effective assistance of counsel. The issue was appealed to the Georgia
Supreme Court. Meders argued the trial court should have appointed a mental
health expert to assist him at the remand hearing, a jury composition expert, and
a criminal defense attorney to testify as an expert witness on the issue of ineffec-
tiveness.
Meders was represented by two attorneys at the remand hearing. The court
held that Meders was not entitled to the appointment of a third attorney to testify
as an expert witness about how to properly try a death penalty case. The court
also held that expert assistance was not necessary to determine whether the jury
lists fairly represented the population of Glynn County. Finally, the court held
that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Meders' motion for independent
psychological assistance at a hearing held to determine whether he had received
effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. Thus, the Georgia Supreme
Court concluded that the trial court persuasively demonstrated that Meders had
failed to overcome the "strong presumption" that the defendant's trial counsel
performed effectively.7"
72. Id. at 171 n.2.
73. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2.
74. Meders v. State, 411 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1992).
75. Id. at 492.
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9. John Hightower78 (5/4/88):
Hightower was convicted of three counts of murder and was sentenced to
death. On appeal, Hightower argued he was denied effective assistance of coun-
sel because his court-appointed attorneys were underpaid. Hightower was repre-
sented by two attorneys.
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by refusing to appoint a third attorney. In addition, the court held that the
amount awarded to the defendant's attorneys for their services was not so low as
to deny the defendant effective assistance of counsel. Moreover, the court
explained that absent evidence that the amount awarded for attorney fees was so
low as to deny effectiveness of counsel, attorney fees was not an issue address-
able on this appeal.
10. Ricky Dane Hatcher" (7/2/88):
Hatcher pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to death following a jury sen-
tencing hearing. Hatcher then appealed the sentence. The defendant had an
appointed attorney represent him at the post-trial proceedings and on appeal. At
the hearing on the motion for a new trial, and also on this appeal, the defendant
argued that his trial attorneys were ineffective because their remarks during voir
dire effectively conceded the issue of guilt, leaving him "no alternative but to
plead guilty."78
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, neither Hatcher nor his trial attor-
neys testified. Looking at the transcript of the guilty-plea hearing, the court
determined that the defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily entered. The court
held that Hatcher failed to show that he felt compelled to plead guilty because of
any action or inaction on the part of his trial attorneys. Hence, the court contin-
ued, assuming deficient attorney performance in the conduct of the voir dire,
Hatcher failed to show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," and
Hatcher would not have pled guilty.79 Thus, the defendant failed to show ineffec-
tiveness of trial counsel.
11. Ronald Leroy Kinsman" (4/18/87):
Kinsman was convicted of malice murder, armed robbery, and theft by taking,
and was sentenced to death. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court's
ruling to allow a state's witness to testify, even though the witness was not on the
list furnished to the defendant, denied the defendant the effective assistance of
counsel.
76. Hightower v. State, 386 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. 1989).
77. Hatcher v. State, 379 S.E.2d 775 (Ga. 1989).
78. Id. at 776.
79. Id. at 776-77 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
80. Kinsman v. State, 376 S.E.2d 845 (Ga. 1989).
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The court explained that Kinsman did not move to exclude the witness and that
the trial court granted Kinsman's request to interview the witness prior to testify-
ing. The witness's testimony was very brief. As a result, the court held that there
was no merit to the defendant's contention that he was denied the effective assis-
tance of counsel by the trial court's ruling.
12. Walter William Curry"' (12/6/84):
Curry was convicted of murder in the course of rape and burglary and was sen-
tenced to death. On appeal, the defendant argued that his trial counsel was inef-
fective in that his attorney failed to request help that the court freely offered.
The court found that counsel was ineffective where counsel failed to obtain an
independent psychiatric evaluation of the defendant. This was a question arising
from counsel's failure to request aid that the court freely offered.82 Despite the
trial court's positive response to a request from Curry's first appointed counsel
for funds for an independent evaluation, Curry's trial counsel never followed up
on this request. In fact, the court found it critical that, upon the court's own
motion that Curry be tested for competency to stand trial, the treating physician's
report was highly unfavorable to the defense. Curry's first appointed attorney
testified by affidavit that he felt it imperative to obtain an independent evaluation
because he believed from his own observations that Curry was severely mentally
handicapped and that his court-appointed examination occurred at an under-
equipped facility. At the habeas hearing, trial counsel responded to these allega-
tions by testifying that, based on his own observations and on the treating physi-
cian's report, he felt an independent examination would be futile. Consequently,
the court concluded that trial counsel's:
failure to take a crucial step of obtaining an independent psychiatric evaluation
of Curry deprived his client of the protection of counsel .... The failure to
obtain a second opinion, which might have been the basis for a successful
defense of not guilty by reason of insanity and would certainly have provided
crucial evidence in mitigation, so prejudiced the defense that the guilty plea and
the sentence of death must be set aside.83
13. Alexander Edmund Williams84 (8/29/86):
Williams was convicted of murder, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping with bodi-
ly injury, motor vehicle theft, and financial transaction card fraud, and he was
sentenced to death. Williams was declared an indigent and was represented at
trial by an appointed counsel. The issue of effective assistance of counsel was
81. Curry v. Zant, 371 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. 1988).
82. The court went on to note that "not every offer extended by the court must be accepted by defense coun-
sel." Id. at 648.
83. Id. at 649.
84. Williams v. State, 368 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. 1988)
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raised on motion for a new trial. The trial court determined that the defendant
received effective assistance of counsel at trial.
On appeal, Williams complained that his trial attorney was ineffective because
he:
(1) failed to object to inadmissible evidence and improper argument by the pros-
ecutor, (2) failed to discover and present mitigating evidence, (3) failed to con-
duct substantive death-qualification voir dire to object to the excusal of quali-
fied venire persons with scruples against the death penalty, and to challenge
venire persons biased in favor of a death sentence, (4) failed to request the court
to investigate a report that the jury had begun deliberations prematurely (5)
failed to request a psychiatric evaluation, and (6) attempted to exclude the testi-
mony of certain state's witnesses when there was no legal basis for doing so.8"
After examining each of the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel con-
tentions, the court concluded that Williams was not denied effective assistance of
counsel. First, the court explained that evidence in aggravation is not limited to
convictions and that reliable information tending to show a defendant's general
bad character is admissible in aggravation. Thus, the court held that the failure
to object was not ineffective assistance. Similarly, the court found the prosecu-
tor's closing argument was not such a misstatement of law88 as would compel an
objection. Second, the court noted that the record did not show that any of the
prospective witnesses87 who Williams claimed should have been called at the
hearing on the motion for a new trial would have testified. Third, counsel's deci-
sions concerning the extent of his voir dire examination and whether or not to
interpose challenges88 were tactical decisions. Fourth, the court asked that the
jury not begin its deliberations prior to the end of closing arguments, and
Williams contends the court's response was "totally inadequate" and that trial
counsel should have requested the court to question the jurors regarding their
premature deliberations.88 The court held that this clearly did "not fall outside
'the wide range of professional assistance."'8 " Finally, the court noted "the bur-
den is on the defendant to show that his attorney's omissions have prejudiced his
case-here, that he has a mental condition that should have been investigated and
offered in mitigation"-Williams failed to sustain this burden."
85. Id. at 748.
86. The prosecutor told the jury to consider "everything that you have heard during the course of this trial...
all of these many things [he gave some examples], and you will then weigh the one against the other and you
will decide what is the appropriate punishment." Id.
87. Williams asserts ineffectiveness of counsel in counsel's failure to call his mother, his minister, and sever-
al other friends as witnesses. Id. at 749.
88. Counsel testified at the hearing that he did not utilize peremptory challenges against two jurors because
he wanted to save those strikes, and the witnesses did not look like they would be adamant toward him. Id.
89. Id. at 750.
90. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)).
91. Id.
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14. James Cook92 (2/23/85):
Cook was convicted of murder and was sentenced to death. On appeal, the
defendant argued that his retained trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel because they: challenged the array of the traverse jury too early and
generally failed to understand the nature of such challenges; they only reviewed
the state's file one time prior to trial; their cross-examination was inadequate;
they failed to properly impeach two state's witnesses, who admitted on cross-
examination that they were on probation; gave too short an opening statement;
underestimated the defendant's chances that he would be convicted of murder
and, as a result, the defendant rejected the state's offer of a life sentence; and
most importantly, trial counsel failed to submit any mitigating evidence to the
jury.
For several reasons, the court held that defense counsel did not render ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. First, reviewing the state's file only once before trial
did not establish that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
Second, even though defense counsel failed to introduce certified copies of con-
victions of two state witnesses, Cook failed to show that he had received ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel and failed to show that either witness had been convict-
ed of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude as would bear on the
witness's credibility. Third, the brevity of defense counsel's opening statement
does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Fourth, trial counsel's fail-
ure to advise Cook to accept a plea bargain offered by the state did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel, though by agreeing to go to trial on the murder
charge, Cook risked the death penalty. Fifth, trial counsel's failure to present
witnesses to testify to Cook's good character did not amount to ineffectiveness
because such presentation would have opened the door to considerable aggravat-
ing evidence by the state. Finally, trial counsel made a reasonable strategic judg-
ment to present less than all of the available mitigating evidence. The court con-
cluded that Cook failed to overcome the "'strong presumption' that the perfor-
mance of his trial attorneys at the sentencing phase of the trial fell within 'the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance."'93
B. Conclusions
Fourteen out of sixty-five, or 22%, of the capital defendants sentenced between
1985 and 1990 in Georgia raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims.94
Contrary to those capital defendants sentenced in the 1973 to 1983 time period,
capital defendants could now rely on the two-prong Strickland standard. As a
result, Georgia courts found that only one death row inmate in Georgia, William
Walter Curry, successfully argued ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby hav-
92. Cook v. State, 340 S.E.2d 843 (Ga. 1986).
93. Id. at 861 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669).
94. See infra, Part IVA.
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ing his death sentence set aside. Therefore, the only basis on which Georgia
courts have found ineffective assistance was trial counsel's blatant failure to
obtain an independent psychiatric evaluation for his client, where the results of
such an evaluation would have provided a formidable defense.
Curry argued an egregious lapse by his trial counsel, who failed to request
financial assistance that the court freely offered. The court noted that counsel's
failure to take the "crucial step of obtaining an independent psychiatric evalua-
tion of [the defendant] deprived his client of the protection of counsel.""5 Among
the other ineffective assistance cases during this period, Curry clearly presented
the most egregious lapse allegedly committed by trial counsel. However, failing
to present mitigating evidence in support of a capital defendant's plea for life is
certainly a close second.
From 1985 to 1990, capital defendants made fewer ineffective assistance of
counsel claims based upon egregious lapses than between 1973 and 1983. First,
Johnson asserted that counsel failed to interview witnesses essential to establish
the facts of his case. Similarly, Ferrell argued that his trial counsel failed to
interview some of the state's witnesses.
A second egregious lapse alleged to have been committed was counsel's failure
to conduct an adequate investigation prior to trial. Such a claim was asserted by
Hammond. He argued that counsel failed to adequately investigate and present
evidence of his mental health at either the trial or sentencing phases of his case.
Additionally, Johnson asserted an egregious lapse of counsel when he argued
that counsel distanced himself from him before and during trial. Johnson
claimed that counsel failed to discuss with him possible defenses and did not
confer with him at all before trial and would not sit with him during trial. In
general, Johnson asserted that his trial counsel was disloyal to him.
Another ineffective assistance of counsel claim premised upon an egregious
lapse was counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence during the sentencing
phase. This serious allegation was asserted by Black, Hammond, Williams, and
Cook. Such claims were based upon counsel's unprepared appearance. Gary
made a claim that his court-appointed counsel was ineffective because he was
unprepared for trial due to a lack of funds. In addition, Brantley argued ineffec-
tiveness based upon counsel's not being given the opportunity to review and
rebut victim impact statements.
Finally, Hatcher argued ineffectiveness because counsel made statements dur-
ing voir dire which effectively conceded the issue of guilt. This error was egre-
gious because counsel should have communicated to the judge and jury with
complete commitment to the client's cause. If proven, this claim could constitute
an ethical violation, as counsel failed to act as a zealous advocate for his client.
The trend of the obviousness of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, com-
paring the 1973-to-1983 and 1985-to-1990 periods, is not remarkable, but is
95. Curry v. Zant, 371 S.E.2d 647, 649 (Ga. 1988).
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readily apparent. Although the proportion of capital defendants who raised inef-
fective assistance claims increased between these two periods, the lapses were
less egregious. Capital defendants between 1985 and 1990 raised fewer ineffec-
tiveness claims premised upon egregious lapses compared to such claims made
by capital defendants sentenced before Strickland. From 1973 to 1983, capital
defendants asserted several obvious blunders committed by counsel, ranging
from an extreme lack of investigation and preparation, to failing to conduct
effective questioning during voir dire. However, between 1985 and 1990, fewer
and less obvious blunders were asserted against capital counsel. Such claims
included counsel's blatant failure to obtain an independent medical evaluation,
failure to present mitigating evidence, failure to conduct an adequate investiga-
tion, and failure to act as a zealous advocate.
V INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS: 1992 THROUGH 199896
A. Summary of Cases
1. Andrew Grant DeYoung97 (10/13/95):
DeYoung was convicted of the malice murders of his parents and his fourteen-
year-old sister. The jury recommended the death penalty and the trial court sen-
tenced him to death on October 13, 1995. On appeal, DeYoung argued that he
was denied effective assistance of trial counsel, claiming his counsel: (1) failed
to move to disqualify venireperson Homer for cause because she had at one time
worked for the district attorney and was a good friend of a secretary who current-
ly worked at that office; (2) should have moved to excuse Homer based upon her
exposure to prejudicial pre-trial publicity; (3) did not conduct effective cross-
examinations during the guilt-innocence phase; (4) should not have elicited testi-
mony from the medical examiner that the absence of any wounds on the victims'
faces could mean that the perpetrator knew or had strong emotional ties to the
victims; and (5) failed to present character evidence in mitigation from witnesses
Butler, Albright, and Fisher.
First, the court found that Homer worked for the district attorney's office for
only one week and had had no contact with the district attorney or any member
of that office since that time. In addition, she stated that her experience would
not affect her judgment in the case. Second, even though Homer read and heard
about the case from newspapers and television coverage, she stated that she
could not remember enough about it to form an opinion. Thus, the court found
that her opinion was not fixed and definite, and failure to move to disqualify her
was not deficient. Third, the court noted that counsel's cross-examination strate-
96. According to the records provided by the NAACP, 46 defendants were sentenced to death between 1992
and 1998. As one would naturally expect, all defendants during this time period appealed their death sentence.
97. DeYoung v. State, 493 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. 1997), cert. denied, DeYoung v. Georgia, 118 S. Ct. 1848 (1998).
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gies 5 were informed tactical decisions which did not amount to inadequacy
under Strickland. Fourth, the court explained that no prejudice resulted from the
exchange between counsel and the medical examiner because there was no rea-
sonable probability that the outcome would have been affected had counsel not
asked the question which led to the medical examiner's response. Finally, the
court held that decisions regarding which witnesses to present were matters of
trial strategy; counsel conducted an extensive investigation into DeYoung's back-
ground, interviewing his teachers, other students at school, co-workers, friends,
and family members. Moreover, the court found that the defendant was exam-
ined by a psychologist and a psychiatrist, and the defense presented extensive
evidence in mitigation. As a result, the court held that DeYoung received effec-
tive assistance of counsel.
2. Troy Anthony Davis99 (8/30/91):
Davis was convicted by a jury of murder, obstruction of a law enforcement
officer, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony. He was sentenced to death for the murder on August 30, 1991. On
appeal, he argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain
evidence and charges, for not requesting certain jury charges, and for not recall-
ing a witness for additional cross-examination. However, the court held, without
comment, that Davis failed to show deficient attorney performance or actual
prejudice and that he failed to show that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel.
3. Marcus A. Wellons1t0 (6/8/93):
Wellons was convicted of malice murder and rape of a fifteen-year-old girl.
The jury sentenced him to death for the murder on June 8, 1993. Wellons
appealed from the judgment entered by the trial court. On appeal, he argued,
among thirty-five enumerations of error, that the presence of the media denied
him effective assistance of counsel. However, the court held, without explana-
tion, that this claim was wholly unsupported by the record.
4. Warren Lee Hill"' (8/2/91):
Hill was convicted of murder by a jury and sentenced to death on August 2,
1991. On appeal, he argued, among twenty-two other enumerated errors, that he
was denied effective assistance of trial counsel when the trial judge failed to
adjourn at a reasonable time." 2
98. One such tactic concerned counsel cross-examining a codefendant about burglaries committed by the
defendant. The court explained that counsel "knew [that the defendant] would be convicted and preferred to
bring out this evidence themselves, rather than allow prosecutor to elicit the evidence during the sentencing
phase where the information could, in their judgment, be more damaging .... [T]he idea behind the strategy
was to portray codefendant as the architect of the other crimes as well as the murders." Id. at 785.
99. Davis v. State, 426 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 1993).
100. Wellons v. State, 463 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. 1995).
101. Hill v. State, 427 S.E.2d 770 (Ga. 1993).
102. The court noted that although the first day of voir dire lasted until 11:00 p.m., the court adjourned
between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on the remaining days of the trial. Id. at 773.
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The court held, however, that the "'trial court retains the discretion to deter-
mine how late to hold court before recessing for the evening.""' 3 Moreover, no
evidence was set forth showing the trial was unfairly expedited either through
long sessions or truncated arguments and examinations. Therefore, the court
held that Hill was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
B. Conclusions
Out of the forty-six capital defendants who were sentenced to death in Georgia
between 1992 and 1998, only four defendants have thus far raised an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim."04 However, a precise proportion of capital defen-
dants raising an ineffectiveness claim cannot be drawn.' The Georgia Supreme
Court will not consider an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal because some
of the critical evidence, such as defense counsel's own testimony regarding strat-
egy, can only be developed outside the appellate record. Thus, ineffectiveness
claims are relegated to a post-conviction collateral attack proceeding. Inasmuch
as the direct appeal takes a few months, the post-conviction trial proceeding can
linger for awhile, and then it has to be appealed. Thus, it can take several years
for a death sentence inmate to have an ineffectiveness claim ripe for appellate
review-some capital defendants for the time period 1992 to 1998 may not yet
have such a "ripe" ineffectiveness claim.
Because it is unclear how many capital defendants sentenced to death between
1992 and 1998 will assert an ineffectiveness claim, a clear trend of the number or
proportion of such claims cannot be positively identified for this time period.
However, other conclusions may be drawn. First, the number of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims decreased from 1973 to 1990. Similarly, the proportion
of capital defendants raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim decreased
over this time period. Most importantly, however, capital defendants made fewer
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on egregious conduct over this
period of time.
Based on the ineffectiveness claims raised thus far, there are less obvious blun-
ders being committed by capital counsel today than between 1973 and 1983.
Only one capital defendant from 1973 to 1983 has successfully argued ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. In addition, before Strickland, several ineffectiveness
claims were premised upon egregious conduct committed by capital counsel,
including the failure to adequately conduct voir dire; to interview witnesses and,
generally, to conduct a thorough investigation; and to adequately prepare for trial.
However, similar egregious claims have not been alleged by capital defendants
between 1992 and 1998 thus far.
103. Id. (quoting Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179, 186 (Ga. 1990)).
104. See infra Part VA.
105. After a thorough WestLaw search, four capital defendants, analyzed above (see infra Part VA.), have
raised ineffectiveness claims, 23 have made direct appeals without raising ineffectiveness claims, and 19 have
yet to make any type of appeal on record.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is extraordinarily difficult for death row inmates to have their death sen-
tences overturned on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Only two
death row inmates in Georgia, one prior to and one subsequent to Strickland,
have had their death sentences reversed based on ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. In most instances, death row inmates have not even asserted such a claim.
However, when an ineffectiveness claim is made, Georgia courts have gone to
great lengths to find effective assistance by trial counsel.
Death row inmates have made several allegations to support their ineffective-
ness arguments, but it appears from the above analysis that attorneys are doing a
reasonably effective job during representation of such clients. During the pre-
Strickland era of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, several claims were
premised upon egregious lapses. Between 1985 and 1990, those egregiousness
claims decreased, but not significantly. Recently, however, only four capital
defendants have asserted ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, more
importantly, they have made fewer ineffective assistance claims premised upon
egregious lapses. Georgia courts support this conclusion: Trial counsel are
"smartening up" and not making the same obvious blunders during representa-
tion of a capital defendant as were made in the previous twenty-five years.
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